前景理论如何解释人在收益与损失面前的态度反转？
How does prospect theory explain the reversal of attitudes between gains and losses?
前景理论用一条以参照点为原点的价值函数刻画选择：收益区间凹向下、损失区间凸向上，且损失一侧更陡，通常损失带来的痛感约为等额收益快感的两倍。由此可推出面对确定收益时倾向回避风险，面对确定损失时反而愿意赌一把以求翻盘，这解释了投资者过早卖出盈利股票而死守亏损股票的处置效应。理论还用决策权重函数说明人们高估极小概率、低估中等概率，从而同时购买保险和彩票。
Prospect theory describes choice with a value function anchored at a reference point: concave over gains, convex over losses, and steeper on the loss side, so a loss typically hurts about twice as much as an equivalent gain pleases. It follows that people avoid risk when facing sure gains but accept gambles when facing sure losses in hopes of breaking even, which explains the disposition effect of selling winning stocks too early while clinging to losers. A decision-weight function further captures overweighting of very small probabilities and underweighting of moderate ones, letting the same person buy both insurance and lottery tickets.
难度 专业 · 适合 高中(15-18)
CC BY 4.0 · 已核验 · Verified 2026-11-04
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Kahneman 与 Tversky（1979）《Econometrica》前景理论；Odean（1998）《Journal of Finance》处置效应实证
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Econometrica, Prospect theory; Odean (1998), Journal of Finance, evidence on the disposition effect
独立核验依据 · Independent verification: 核验依据 1 Crossref DOI 10.2307/1914185（复合著录按段核验：本标识只担保第一段 Kahneman
#前景理论 #损失厌恶 #参照点
锚定效应有多顽固？为什么明显随机的数字也会影响估计？
How stubborn is anchoring, and why can an obviously random number sway an estimate?
特沃斯基与卡尼曼让被试先转动一个操纵过的转盘，再估计联合国中非洲国家的比例，转到较大数字的一组给出的估计明显更高，尽管数字来源与问题毫无关系。机制主要有两条：不充分调整，即人们以锚为起点向目标方向调整但停得太早；以及选择性可及性，锚点激活了与之一致的信息，使这些内容在判断时更容易被想起。锚定在专家身上同样出现，例如房地产估价受挂牌价影响，事先警告往往只能部分削弱效应。
Tversky and Kahneman had participants spin a rigged wheel before estimating the share of African nations in the United Nations, and those who landed on a larger number gave markedly higher estimates even though the number was transparently irrelevant. Two mechanisms dominate: insufficient adjustment, where people start from the anchor and move toward the target but stop too soon, and selective accessibility, where the anchor primes anchor-consistent information that then comes to mind during judgement. Anchoring appears in experts too — real-estate appraisals shift with listing prices — and forewarning typically reduces the effect only partially.
难度 专业 · 适合 高中(15-18)
CC BY 4.0 · 来源待核验 · Source pending review
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出处备注：著录含书名，但缺版次 / 出版社 / 年份中的一部分，需编辑补全后才能做独立比对。
Tversky 与 Kahneman（1974）《Science》不确定条件下的判断；Northcraft 与 Neale（1987）《Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes》房产估价研究
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Science, Judgment under uncertainty; Northcraft and Neale (1987), Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, property appraisal study
#锚定效应 #启发式 #不充分调整
某病患病率为千分之一，检测灵敏度99%、假阳性率1%。某人检出阳性，他真正患病的概率大约是多少？为什么许多医生会给出九成以上的估计？
A disease affects 1 in 1,000 people; a test detects 99% of cases and has a 1% false-positive rate. A person tests positive—what is the approximate probability they truly have the disease, and why do many physicians answer above ninety percent?
用贝叶斯定理估算：每10万人中约100名患者几乎全部检出，另有约999名健康人被误报，故阳性者真患病的概率约为100÷(100+999)≈9%。Casscells等人1978年在《新英格兰医学杂志》发表的调查中，多数医生答70%—95%。原因在于基础比率忽视：代表性启发式让人紧盯检测准确率，无视先验概率的主导作用。
By Bayes' theorem: out of 100,000 people, roughly 100 true cases are nearly all detected, while about 999 healthy people are falsely flagged, so a positive result implies a genuine probability near 100/(100+999) ≈ 9%. In the survey Casscells and colleagues published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1978, most physicians answered between 70% and 95%. Such base-rate neglect reflects the representativeness heuristic: attention locks onto the test's accuracy while low prevalence quietly dominates the outcome.
难度 专业 · 适合 高中(15-18)
CC BY 4.0 · 来源待核验 · Source pending review
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出处备注：著录含书名，但缺版次 / 出版社 / 年份中的一部分，需编辑补全后才能做独立比对。
Casscells, Schoenberger & Graboys（1978），《新英格兰医学杂志》299(18)，999–1001：医生解读临床化验结果的调查
Casscells, W., Schoenberger, A., & Graboys, T. B. (1978). Interpretation by physicians of clinical laboratory results. New England Journal of Medicine, 299(18), 999-1001.
#判断与决策 #贝叶斯推理 #基础比率忽视 #代表性启发式
计划谬误是什么？参照类别预测法为什么能纠正它？
What is the planning fallacy, and why does reference class forecasting correct it?
计划谬误指人们在估算项目工期与成本时系统性偏乐观，因为习惯采用内部视角：设想理想的执行路径，逐步累加时间，却忽略了历史上同类项目普遍出现的意外与返工。参照类别预测法要求转向外部视角，先找出足够多的可比项目，用其实际工期与超支的分布作为基准，再根据本项目的特殊之处做有限调整。这一方法已被写入部分国家的基础设施评估规范，用于对大型工程的乐观偏差进行强制上调。
The planning fallacy is the systematic optimism in estimating project duration and cost that arises from taking an inside view: imagining an ideal execution path and adding up steps while ignoring the surprises and rework that historically afflict comparable projects. Reference class forecasting insists on the outside view, assembling a large enough set of similar past projects, using the observed distribution of their durations and overruns as the baseline, and only then making limited adjustments for what is genuinely unusual here. The technique has been written into some national infrastructure appraisal guidance as a mandatory optimism-bias uplift for large works.
难度 进阶 · 适合 初中(12-15)
CC BY 4.0 · 来源待核验 · Source pending review
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出处备注：著录含书名，但缺版次 / 出版社 / 年份中的一部分，需编辑补全后才能做独立比对。
Kahneman 与 Tversky（1979）直觉预测与纠偏程序论文；Flyvbjerg（2006）《Project Management Journal》参照类别预测
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Intuitive prediction: biases and corrective procedures; Flyvbjerg (2006), Project Management Journal, reference class forecasting
#计划谬误 #外部视角 #乐观偏差
为什么人们害怕坐飞机却不担心开车？风险感知受哪些因素支配？
Why do people fear flying but not driving, and what drives risk perception?
可得性启发式让判断依赖于事例回想的容易程度，空难报道密集且画面震撼，因而在记忆中格外突出，而每天发生的交通死亡分散且不被报道。斯洛维克的心理测量研究进一步发现，公众的风险感知主要沿两个维度组织：可怕程度，包括是否灾难性、是否无法控制、是否危及后代；以及未知程度，包括是否不可观察、后果是否延迟。这解释了为什么核能与转基因引发的担忧远高于统计死亡率相近甚至更高的日常风险。
The availability heuristic makes judgement depend on how easily instances come to mind, and air crashes are densely reported with striking imagery, so they loom large in memory while daily road deaths are dispersed and unreported. Slovic's psychometric research further showed public risk perception organises along two dimensions: dread, covering catastrophic potential, uncontrollability, and threat to future generations, and the unknown, covering unobservability and delayed effects. That is why nuclear power and genetic modification provoke far more concern than everyday hazards with comparable or higher statistical mortality.
难度 进阶 · 适合 初中(12-15)
CC BY 4.0 · 已核验 · Verified 2026-11-03
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Slovic（1987）《Science》风险感知；Tversky 与 Kahneman（1973）《Cognitive Psychology》可得性启发式
Slovic (1987), Science, Perception of risk; Tversky and Kahneman (1973), Cognitive Psychology, Availability
独立核验依据 · Independent verification: 核验依据 1 OPENLIBRARY 标识 /works/OL8319813W：The Perception of Risk（
#风险感知 #可得性启发式 #心理测量范式
峰终定律是什么？它为什么让更长的痛苦被记成更轻？
What is the peak-end rule, and why can a longer ordeal be remembered as less painful?
回顾性评价主要由体验中的峰值强度与结束时的水平决定，而对持续时间相对不敏感，这被称为峰终定律和持续时间忽视。卡尼曼的冷水实验让被试分别把手浸入冰水六十秒，或六十秒后再延长三十秒并让水温略微回升，多数人更愿意重复第二种更长但结尾更舒适的体验。这一规律影响临床操作设计、服务体验管理与医疗程序的收尾方式，同时也提醒记忆效用与实时体验效用可能系统性背离。
Retrospective evaluations are dominated by the peak intensity during an episode and by how it ends, while being relatively insensitive to how long it lasted — the peak-end rule together with duration neglect. In Kahneman's cold-water study participants immersed a hand in ice water for sixty seconds, or for sixty seconds followed by thirty more during which the water warmed slightly, and most preferred to repeat the longer trial with the gentler ending. The pattern shapes clinical procedure design, service experience management, and how medical procedures are concluded, and it warns that remembered utility can diverge systematically from moment-by-moment experience.
难度 进阶 · 适合 初中(12-15)
CC BY 4.0 · 已核验 · Verified 2026-11-03
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Kahneman 等（1993）《Psychological Science》更多痛苦被偏好；Redelmeier 与 Kahneman（1996）《Pain》结肠镜研究
Kahneman et al. (1993), Psychological Science, When more pain is preferred to less; Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996), Pain, colonoscopy study
独立核验依据 · Independent verification: 核验依据 1 CROSSREF 标识 10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00589.x：When More
#峰终定律 #持续时间忽视 #记忆效用
双系统理论中的系统一和系统二各负责什么？这一划分有哪些局限？
What do System 1 and System 2 do in dual-process theory, and what are the limits of that split?
系统一指快速、并行、几乎不耗费主观努力的直觉加工，负责识别面孔、理解母语、对危险作出即时反应；系统二则是缓慢、串行、需要注意资源的受控加工，用于逻辑推理、复杂计算和自我监控。卡尼曼强调多数判断由系统一给出，系统二往往只是事后为直觉寻找理由，因而偏差得以保留。局限在于两个系统更像描述性隐喻而非解剖意义上的独立模块，实证上难以清晰划界，近年研究更倾向用加工特征的连续维度而不是二分标签来刻画。
System 1 denotes fast, parallel, effortless intuitive processing that recognises faces, comprehends one's native language, and reacts instantly to threat, while System 2 is slow, serial, attention-demanding controlled processing used for logical reasoning, deliberate computation, and self-monitoring. Kahneman stressed that most judgements originate in System 1, with System 2 often merely supplying after-the-fact justifications, which is how biases survive. The limitation is that the two systems function as descriptive metaphors rather than anatomically separate modules, the boundary is hard to draw empirically, and recent work prefers continuous dimensions of processing over a binary label.
难度 进阶 · 适合 初中(12-15)
CC BY 4.0 · 已核验 · Verified 2026-10-03
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Kahneman《思考，快与慢》(2011)；Evans 与 Stanovich(2013)《双系统推理理论》,《认知科学趋势》(Trends in Cognitive Sciences)第17卷第10期,471-481
Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011); Evans, K. E., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-Systems Theory of Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(10), 471-481.
#双系统理论 #直觉加工 #认知偏差
什么是框架效应？为什么同一个问题换个说法，人们就会做出相反的选择？
What is the framing effect, and why can a mere rephrasing of the same problem drive people to opposite choices?
框架效应指对同一决策问题的不同表述会引发系统性不同的偏好。经典“亚洲疾病问题”中，600人生命受威胁：方案被描述为“确定救活200人”时，多数人选它；改成“400人将死亡”后，多数人转而冒险。机制在于参照点依赖与损失规避：以存活数为参照时人们回避风险，损失被凸显时人们宁可一搏。偏好取决于呈现方式，而非仅由结果决定。
The framing effect is the systematic divergence of preferences caused by different descriptions of one decision problem. In the classic “Asian disease problem,” an epidemic threatens 600 lives: described as certainly saving 200, the program wins majority support; recast as letting 400 die, most switch to the risky alternative. Reference dependence joined with loss aversion explains this—anchored on survivors, people shun risk; with losses made salient, they prefer to gamble. Preference hinges on presentation, not on outcomes alone.
难度 进阶 · 适合 大众
CC BY 4.0 · 已核验 · Verified 2026-11-03
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Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D.（1981），Science 第211卷第4481期，453–458；“亚洲疾病问题”；doi:10.1126/science.7455683
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211(4481), 453-458. doi:10.1126/science.7455683
独立核验依据 · Independent verification: 核验依据 1 CROSSREF 标识 10.1126/science.7455683：The Framing of Decis
#框架效应 #损失规避 #前景理论 #风险决策
确认偏误（confirmation bias）是什么？
What is confirmation bias?
确认偏误指人倾向于寻找、解读和记住支持自己既有观点的信息，而忽视相反证据。它在阅读新闻、辩论和科学推理中都很常见。意识到这一偏差有助于主动接触不同立场，减少误判。
Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek, interpret, and remember information that supports one's existing beliefs while ignoring contrary evidence. It appears in reading news, debate, and scientific reasoning alike. Recognizing it helps one deliberately engage opposing views and reduce error.
难度 入门 · 适合 大众
CC BY 4.0 · 已核验 · Verified 2026-08-23 · 2 条独立证据
来源 · Source
Daniel Kahneman,《Thinking, Fast and Slow》Farrar Straus Giroux,2011;中译《思考，快与慢》中信出版社,2012
D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, FSG, 2011; Chinese ed.《思考，快与慢》CITIC, 2012
独立核验依据 · Independent verification: 核验依据 2 OPENLIBRARY 标识 /works/OL15992072W：Thinking, Fast and Slo
#确认偏误 #认知偏差 #推理
什么是锚定效应（anchoring effect）？
What is the anchoring effect?
锚定效应指人在估计时会过度依赖最先接触到的数字（锚），后续判断围绕它上下调整。例如先看到高价的商品，再看到中等价会觉便宜。即使锚本身是随机无关的数字，也会暗中拉偏判断。
The anchoring effect is that people rely too heavily on the first number they see (the anchor) when estimating, then adjust up or down from it. For example, seeing an expensive item first makes a mid-price item seem cheap. Even a random, irrelevant anchor can silently bias the judgment.
难度 入门 · 适合 大众
CC BY 4.0 · 已核验 · Verified 2026-08-23 · 2 条独立证据
来源 · Source
Daniel Kahneman,《Thinking, Fast and Slow》Farrar Straus Giroux,2011;中译《思考，快与慢》中信出版社,2012
D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, FSG, 2011; Chinese ed.《思考，快与慢》CITIC, 2012
独立核验依据 · Independent verification: 核验依据 2 OPENLIBRARY 标识 /works/OL15992072W：Thinking, Fast and Slo
#锚定效应 #决策偏差 #判断
什么是可用性启发法（availability heuristic）？
What is the availability heuristic?
可用性启发法指人根据某类事件在记忆中是否容易想起，来判断它发生的概率。容易回忆的（如空难、谋杀新闻）会被认为更常见，而默默高频的事件被低估。它是对不确定性的快捷判断，却常因媒体曝光而失真。
The availability heuristic is judging how likely an event is by how easily examples come to mind. Events that are easy to recall, like plane crashes or murders in the news, are judged more common than they are, while quietly frequent events are underestimated. It is a mental shortcut under uncertainty that media exposure often distorts.
难度 入门 · 适合 大众
CC BY 4.0 · 已核验 · Verified 2026-08-23 · 2 条独立证据
来源 · Source
Daniel Kahneman,《Thinking, Fast and Slow》Farrar Straus Giroux,2011;中译《思考，快与慢》中信出版社,2012
D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, FSG, 2011; Chinese ed.《思考，快与慢》CITIC, 2012
独立核验依据 · Independent verification: 核验依据 2 OPENLIBRARY 标识 /works/OL15992072W：Thinking, Fast and Slo
#可用性启发法 #启发法 #判断偏差