重复博弈如何缓解囚徒困境？
How can repeated games ease the prisoner's dilemma?
当互动长期重复，一方可用“以牙还牙”等策略惩罚背叛、奖励合作，使长期合作比短期背叛更有利，从而维持合作；但次数有限或匿名时仍易破裂。
When interaction repeats, a player can punish defection and reward cooperation (e.g., tit-for-tat), making long-run cooperation pay more than short-run cheating; cooperation still breaks down with finite rounds or anonymity.
难度 专业 · 适合 大众
CC BY 4.0 · 已核验 · Verified 2026-10-03 · 3 条独立证据
来源 · Source
N. Gregory Mankiw,《Principles of Economics》第8版,Cengage,2017;中译《经济学原理》北京大学出版社
N. G. Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 8th ed., Cengage, 2017; Chinese ed. Peking University Press
独立核验依据 · Independent verification: 核验依据 2 cengage.com
#重复博弈 #以牙还牙
囚徒困境如何帮助理解军备竞赛？
How does the prisoner's dilemma help explain arms races?
两国都不扩军最安全、也最省钱，但各自担心对方先动手而选择扩军，结果双方都更危险、更费钱，陷入“互不信任—竞相扩军”的循环。
Both countries would be safest and richest without arming, but each fears the other moving first and arms anyway, leaving both more dangerous and poorer—a cycle of distrust and escalation.
难度 进阶 · 适合 初中(12-15)
CC BY 4.0 · 已核验 · Verified 2026-10-03 · 3 条独立证据
来源 · Source
N. Gregory Mankiw,《Principles of Economics》第8版,Cengage,2017;中译《经济学原理》北京大学出版社
N. G. Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 8th ed., Cengage, 2017; Chinese ed. Peking University Press
独立核验依据 · Independent verification: 核验依据 2 cengage.com
#军备竞赛 #博弈
什么是“囚徒困境”？
What is the "prisoner's dilemma"?
它是博弈论经典模型：两人各自选择“背叛”对己最安全，但都背叛的结果比都合作更糟，说明个人理性可能导致集体不利。
It is a classic game-theory model: each person's safest choice is to defect, yet mutual defection is worse than mutual cooperation, showing how individual rationality can harm the group.
难度 进阶 · 适合 大众
CC BY 4.0 · 已核验 · Verified 2026-10-03 · 3 条独立证据
来源 · Source
N. Gregory Mankiw,《Principles of Economics》第8版,Cengage,2017;中译《经济学原理》北京大学出版社
N. G. Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 8th ed., Cengage, 2017; Chinese ed. Peking University Press
独立核验依据 · Independent verification: 核验依据 2 cengage.com
#囚徒困境 #合作